

Message Text

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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NATO 04594

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SECDEF FOR OASD/ISA AND DDR&E

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, MILI, OCON

SUBJECT: MISSION ELEMENT NEED STATEMENT (MENS)

REF: (A) STATE 093317 (DTG 260024Z APR 77); (B) JCS 9745

(DTG 121529Z APR 77); (C) USNATO 4126 (DTG 261348Z MAY77)

AND (D) USDEL 217/76 (DTG 191438Z MAR 76)

SUMMARY. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES COMMENTS ON THE DOD STEERING GROUP PROPOSAL FOR A SYSTEM OF MISSION ELEMENT NEED STATEMENTS (MENS). WE CONCUR IN THE NEED FOR AND RATIONALE SUPPORTING THE MENS PROPOSAL. WE RECOMMEND THAT INTRODUCTION OF THE MENS PROPOSAL BE FOLDED INTO THE US LONG-TERM INITIATIVE ON RATIONALIZATION. OUR COMMENTS ON THE MENS CONCEPT FOCUS ON THE REQUIREMENT TO TRANSFORM THE MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION (MAS) TO ACCOMMODATE MENS, THE DEPENDENCE OF THE MENS SYSTEM ON PROJECTED THREAT DATA, AND COMMON TACTICS. END SUMMARY.

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1. REFS A AND B REQUESTED USNATO AND USDELMC COMMENTS ON THE DOD STEERING GROUP PROPOSAL FOR DOCTRINE AND WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT IN NATO. WE CONCUR IN THE NEED FOR AND RATIONALE SUPPORTING THE THREE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN REF B. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE MISSION ELEMENT NEED STATEMENT (MENS) SYSTEM SHOULD BE EXAMINED AS A PART OF THE US

LONG-TERM INITIATIVE ON RATIONALIZATION, NOT AS A SEPARATE AND PARALLEL PROGRAM. WE SEE THE PROVISIONS OF A MENS BEING INCORPORATED INTO AN OVERALL LONG-TERM PLAN FOR NATO STANDARDIZATION/INTEROPERABILITY.

2. OUR COMMENTS ON THE MENS CONCEPT ITSELF FOCUS ON THREE SPECIFIC AREAS: (A) THE REQUIREMENT TO TRANSFORM THE MAS TO ACCOMMODATE MENS; (B) THE DEPENDENCE OF THE MENS SYSTEM ON PROJECTED THREAT DATA, AND (C) COMMON TACTICS.

3. WITH RESPECT TO EXPANDING THE PRESENT CHARTER OF THE MAS, WE BELIEVE MUCH MORE IS INVOLVED THAN IS IMPLIED BY THE TERM EXPANSION (REF B). WE SEE A NEED FOR A SUBSTANTIAL REORGANIZATION AND STRENGTHENING OF THE CHAIRMAN'S OFFICE AND INCREASED MANNING FOR MAS TO ACCOMPLISH THE OBJECTIVES PROPOSED UNDER MENS WHILE CONTINUING ITS PRESENT WORK. WE WOULD NOT WANT TO SEE THE MAS WORK ON DEVELOPING SPECIFICATION TYPE STANAGS DEEMPHASIZED AS A RESULT OF A REDIRECTION OF ITS MISSION, BECAUSE THE SPECIFICATION-TYPE STANAGS ARE THE BUILDING BLOCKS FOR STANDARDIZING FUTURE EQUIPMENT. THEREFORE, WE SEE PROPOSALS 2 AND 3 (REF B) AS ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS, NOT AS SIMPLY EXPANDED ONES. COMMENT: SINCE THE MAS IS PRIMARILY STAFFED BY MILITARY PERSONNEL, MANNING REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT RELATED TO THOSE DETAILED IN REF C. END COMMENT.

4. IN ADDITION, THE SENSITIVITY OF THE FRENCH WITH RESPECT TO PROPOSED CHANGES IN MAS IS WELL KNOWN. THE FRENCH PARTICIPATE FULLY IN BOTH THE MAS AND THE CNAD. CONFIDENTIAL

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THIS PARTICIPATION IS CRITICAL FOR STANAGS SINCE DESPITE ITS PUBLIC STANCE, FRANCE'S CONTINUED RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF STANAGS, PRODUCTS OF BOTH THE MAS AND CNAD, IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT FOR ENSURING STANDARDIZED SPECIFICATIONS, EQUIPMENT AND TACTICAL DOCTRINE BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND OTHER ALLIANCE FORCES. GREECE ALSO PARTICIPATES FULLY IN THE MAS AND THE CNAD. WHILE NOT AS VOCAL AS FRANCE ON PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE MAS STRUCTURE, GREEK AND FRENCH PARTICIPATION MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THE SAME CONTEXT.

5. WE BELIEVE THE INTRODUCTION OF THE MENS SYSTEM MUST BE CAREFULLY STAGED TO ENSURE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE ALLIANCE AT FIFTEEN. AS NOTED ABOVE, THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO INTRODUCE MENS NOW IS THROUGH THE US LONG-TERM INITIATIVE ON RATIONALIZATION. HOWEVER, IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING THE LONG-TERM PLANS CALLED FOR BY THE US INITIATIVES, WE COULD RISK OVERLOADING THE CIRCUIT, FOR EXAMPLE, IF WE TRY TO SIMULTANEOUSLY REORGANIZE THE MAS.

THEREFORE, AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO INTRODUCING MENS THROUGH THE RATIONALIZATION INITIATIVE, AND BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THE NAC RATHER THAN THE DPC MUST PUT ITS SEAL ON MENS, WE RECOMMEND THAT MENS BE INTRODUCED VIA THE AD HOC COMMITTEE. WE SEE THIS NOT AS A LONG TERM PROJECT OF THE COMMITTEE, BUT RATHER AS A RECOMMENDATION STEMMING FROM THE REQUIREMENT CONTAINED IN THE AHC'S TERMS OF REFERENCE, I.E., TO DEVELOP PROCEDURES TO ENSURE INTEROPERABILITY OF FUTURE EQUIPMENT. WASHINGTON WILL RECALL THAT THE PROCEDURES TO ENSURE INTEROPERABILITY OF FUTURE EQUIPMENT ARE BEING DEVELOPED BY THE CNAD STUDY GROUP ON A PERIODIC

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ARMAMENTS PLANNING SYSTEM (PAPS). HENCE WE HAVE A ROUTE WHICH MAKES THE PAPS CONNECTION (REF A), HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF INTRODUCING MENS AT THE FIFTEEN NATION LEVEL AND, ULTIMATELY CAN RECEIVE NAC APPROVAL. COMMENT: MENS COULD BE A CONCRETE PROPOSAL STEMMING FROM THE PAPS STUDY ITSELF. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH THIS ROUTE WOULD HAVE SIMILAR ADVANTAGES TO A RECOMMENDATION FROM THE AHC, IT WOULD NOT HAVE THE POLITICAL EMPHASIS OF AN AHC RECOMMENDATION. END COMMENT.

6. WE BELIEVE THAT PROJECTED THREAT DATA COULD BE THE MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK TO THE ACCEPTANCE AND WORKABILITY OF MENS. ALTHOUGH THE COUNTERPOINT OF THREAT ASSESSMENT AND EQUIPMENT DEVELOPMENT IS ESSENTIAL, WE SEE A TOUGH STRUGGLE TO EXTEND AGREED NATO THREAT INFORMATION SUFFI-

CIENTLY INTO THE FUTURE TO INCORPORATE THE TIMESCALES
NECESSARY FOR THE R&D, DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT OF NEW
EQUIPMENT.

7. THE FAILURE OF THE NATO BASIC MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
(NBMR) OF THE MID-SIXTIES IS COMMONLY ATTRIBUTED TO THE
NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES' INABILITY TO MAKE THEIR REQUIRE-
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MENTS A REALITY AS NATIONS CONTROL THE FUNDS NECESSARY TO
TRANSLATE THE MILITARY REQUIREMENT INTO EQUIPMENT. WE
BELIEVE THIS IS ONLY A PARTIAL EXPLANATION. THE PROBLEM
OF PROJECTING THREAT DATA SUFFICIENTLY INTO THE FUTURE IS
WHAT REALLY LURKS IN THE BACKGROUND. NATIONS WERE
RELUCTANT TO PROVIDE FUNDS IN RESPONSE TO AN NBMR THEY
CONSIDERED WAS BASED ON AN INADEQUATE ASSESSMENT OF THE
THREAT AS PERCEIVED FROM THEIR CAPITALS. IN SUPPORT OF
THIS VIEW, WE ONLY HAVE TO CONSIDER HOW THE CNAD OPERATES
TO SEE WHAT HAPPENS IN A COOPERATIVE NATO PROGRAM. THE
FIRST STEP, AN AGREED OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT, RESULTS
FROM GIVE AND TAKE BY NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES WHO HAVE
ARRIVED FROM CAPITALS TO NEGOTIATE A PROGRAM WHICH FITS
THEIR NATION'S PERCEIVED CONCEPT OF THE THREAT, PROJECTED
SUFFICIENTLY INTO THE FUTURE TO COVER THE PERIOD BETWEEN
PROGRAM INITIATION AND FIELDING OF THE EQUIPMENT.

8. REFERENCE C, PARAGRAPH 4, DEFINES THE PRESENT STATUS
OF COMMON DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES IN NATO. WE MUST AGAIN
EMPHASIZE THAT WE BELIEVE THAT OUR ALLIES ARE MORE THAN
WILLING TO WORK TOWARD AGREEMENT ON COMMON OPERATIONAL
CONCEPTS, DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON TACTICAL DOCTRINE, AND
STANDARDIZATION OF OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES. HOWEVER, THEY
ARE LESS THAN WILLING TO AGREE ON COMMON TACTICS BECAUSE
OF THE UNDERLYING DIFFERENCES OF VIEW BY NATIONS REGARDING
THE USE OF TACTICS IN THE CONCEPT OF BATTLE.

9. IN SUMMARY, WE BELIEVE THE ALLIANCE NEEDS MENS AS A
FUNCTIONAL MECHANISM FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE
OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS. WE RECOM-
MEND AN EXTENSIVE LOOK AT THE PRESENT MAS ORGANIZATION
AND AT THE IMPACT THE CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY MENS WOULD
HAVE ON IT. COMMENT: PERHAPS THE USDELMAS COULD PROVIDE
EXPERTISE IN ANALYZING THE MAS ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS OF
MENS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE WASHINGTON WILL WANT
TO REVIEW THE FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS OF THE USDELMAS AND
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POSSIBLY REDIRECT ITS ESSENTIALLY SERVICE ORIENTED OPERATION INTO A SYSTEM WHICH CAN ESTABLISH A COORDINATED US POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE MAS. END COMMENT. ALSO, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE PROBLEM OF THE AGREED THREAT BE EXAMINED, SINCE IT IS LACK OF A FORMAL NATO-AGREED LONG-TERM THREAT PROJECTION WHICH CAUSES THE CNAD ORGANIZATION TO BE THE SOURCE OF A NEW ALLIANCE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY RATHER THAN A RESPONSE MECHANISM TO A STATED MILITARY NEED. COMMENT: WE UNDERSTAND THAT MC/161, WARSAW PACT STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES, WILL BE REVIEWED AND UPDATED THIS SUMMER. WASHINGTON MAY WANT TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE A STRONG PUSH TO EXPAND THE AGREED NATO THREAT PROJECTIONS. END COMMENT.

10. THIS IS A JOINT USNATO/USDELMC MESSAGE.BENNETT

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